Lock Ratings
 
Group 2
 
Group 2M
 
Group 1
 
Group 1R
 
Type 1 Electronic
 
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U.L. Group 2 Mechanical Lock

U.L. (Underwriter's Labratory, Inc.) is an independent, third party product certification organization that rigorously tests products to ensure they conform to certain safety and security standards. Once a product is certified, it carries the U.L. label to give consumers confidence that the product will provide a certain degree of security and safety. As part of the certification, U.L. will routinely visit the manufacturer to make sure the certified product continues to meet the standard.  When it comes to locks, U.L. defines not only specifics on the construction of the lock, but also its resistance to manipulation attacks.

U.L. defines Group 2 combination locks as resistant to semiskilled manipulation attacks. A manipulation attack is any attempt to discern the combination on the lock using the features and weaknesses in the design of the lock.  For example, if you've ever seen a movie with a safe cracker attempting to listen (possibly with a stethoscope) to learn the combination, this is considered a manipulation attack.  In addition, any attempt to randomly or systematically explore the namespace of combinations (the allowed range of possible combinations) is also a manipulation attack.  Note that Group 2 locks are less than 2 hours resistant against truly sophisticated and skilled safe crackers.  However, the vast majority of attacks against most safes can hardly be considered sophisticated or skilled and so Group 2 locks are the most common locks available on most safes.

U.L. also defines the minimum number of combinations that the lock will allow, which is 1,000,000.  However, this is a technical specification and on most locks there are specific recommended restrictions in assigning a combination that effectively limits the allowable combinations.  For example, it is recommended to avoid an approximate 20 digit range for the last number on a three-number combination lock.  On the S&G 6741 (the standard combination lock we use) that range is 95-15.  While it is possible to set the final number to somewhere in that range, it will most likely cause problems when attempting to open the lock due to the lock design.  In addition, all locks have dialing tolerances, which is how much error is allowed in dialing the combination before the lock won't open.  The S&G 6741 has a +/- 1.25 dialing tolerance.  This means that the lock can be dialed up to 1.25 digits above or below the actual set number and still open, essentially giving you a 2.5 digit window to hit.  The S&G 6730, however, has only a +/- .5 dialing tolerance, essentially giving a 1 digit window to hit. While many locksmiths might prefer the S&G 6730, it can be notoriously difficult to open and very unforgiving to human error.  In addition, slight alterations to the lock (for example, if the dial or the dial ring was bumped during shipping) can shift the combination, rendering the lock unusable.  For this reason, most manufacturers tend to prefer the S&G 6741 because it's easier to use.  U.L. specifies that Group 2 locks have a dialing tolerance of no more than +/- 1.25.

In addition, Group 2 locks are required to have an internal relocking system that fires when the lock is punched.  Punching (using a hammer and punch tool) is done to try to push the lock off the back of the safe by driving a punch (or any object long and sturdy enough) through the dial spindle hole.  If this is done, usually the internals of the lock will be pushed out (leaving the frame) but a device will spring into place preventing the bolt itself from being retracted.  However, if the entire lock is managed to be punched through (not just the 'guts' of the lock), then no relocking system internal to the lock will be effective.  For that reason, we at Hayman Safe have developed a secondary relocking system designed to fire a secondary bolt in the case that the lock is punched out.  This secondary relocking bolt adds another layer of security to the safe.  Every standard Hayman Safe has this feature.

In general, Group 2 locks are considered suitable for RSC, insulated record safes, and other general security containers, including most B and C rated safes.  Group 2 locks are probably the most common lock put on safes and function well for most applications. However, it is not recommended to put a Group 2 lock on higher rated safes such as the TL-15, TL-30 and other high security safes.

 

U.L. Group 2M Mechanical Lock

U.L. (Underwriter's Labratory, Inc.) is an independent, third party product certification organization that rigorously tests products to ensure they conform to certain safety and security standards. Once a product is certified, it carries the U.L. label to give consumers confidence that the product will provide a certain degree of security and safety. As part of the certification, U.L. will routinely visit the manufacturer to make sure the certified product continues to meet the standard.  When it comes to locks, U.L. defines not only specifics on the construction of the lock, but also it's resistance to manipulation attacks.  They do not, however, specify any kind of resistance to brute force attacks.

U.L. defines Group 2M combination locks as resistant to skilled manipulation attacks for up to two hours. A manipulation attack is any attempt to discern the combination on the lock using the features and weaknesses in the design of the lock.  For example, if you've ever seen a movie with a safe cracker attempting to listen (possibly with a stethoscope) to learn the combination, this is considered a manipulation attack.  In addition, any attempt to randomly or systematically explore the namespace of combinations (the allowed range of possible combinations) is also a manipulation attack.  The Group 2M class is a subcategory that was introduced to fill in a gap between the specifications of Group 2 and Group 1 locks.  In general, Group 1 locks were considered overkill for any safe carrying less than TL-30x6 rating and Group 2 locks were considered insufficient for the TL-15 and TL-30 rated safes.  The Group 2M locks provide a middle ground.

U.L. also defines the minimum number of combinations that the lock will allow, which is 1,000,000.  However, this is a technical specification and on most locks there are specific recommended restrictions in assigning a combination that effectively limits the allowable combinations.  For example, it is recommended to avoid an approximate 20 digit range for the last number on a three-number combination lock.  On the S&G 6741 (the standard Group 2 combination lock we use) that range is 95-15.  While it is possible to set the final number to somewhere in that range, it will most likely cause problems when attempting to open the lock due to the lock design.  In addition, all locks have dialing tolerances, which is how much error is allowed in dialing the combination before the lock won't open.  The S&G 6741 has a +/- 1.25 dialing tolerance.  This means that the lock can be dialed up to 1.25 digits above or below the actual set number and still open, essentially giving you a 2.5 digit window to hit.  The S&G 6730, however, has only a +/- .5 dialing tolerance, essentially giving a 1 digit window to hit. While many locksmiths might prefer the S&G 6730, it can be notoriously difficult to open and very unforgiving to human error.  In addition, slight alterations to the lock (for example, if the dial or the dial ring was bumped during shipping) can shift the combination, rendering the lock unusable.  For this reason, most manfacturers tend to prefer the S&G 6741 because it's easier to use.  U.L. specifies that Group 2M locks have a dialing tolerance of no more than +/- 1.25.

In addition, Group 2M locks are required to have an internal relocking system that fires when the lock is punched.  Punching (using a hammer and punch tool) is done to try to push the lock off the back of the safe by driving a punch (or any object long and sturdy enough) through the dial spindle hole.  If this is done, the usually the internals of the lock will be pushed out (leaving the frame) but a device will spring into place preventing the bolt itself from being retracted.  However, if the entire lock is managed to be punched through (not just the 'guts' of the lock), then no relocking system internal to the lock will be effective.  For that reason, we at Hayman Safe have developed a secondary relocking system designed to fire a secondary bolt in the case that the lock is punched out.  This secondary relocking bolt adds another layer of security to the safe.  Every standard Hayman Safe has this feature.

In general, Group 2M locks are considered suitable for TL-15, TL-30 and TL30x6 safes.  They are also often used on E rate safes, but not always.

 

U.L. Group 1 Mechanical Lock

U.L. (Underwriter's Labratory, Inc.) is an independent, third party product certification organization that rigorously tests products to ensure they conform to certain safety and security standards. Once a product is certified, it carries the U.L. label to give consumers confidence that the product will provide a certain degree of security and safety. As part of the certification, U.L. will routinely visit the manufacturer to make sure the certified product continues to meet the standard.  When it comes to locks, U.L. defines not only specifics on the construction of the lock, but also its resistance to manipulation attacks.  They do not, however, specify any kind of resistance to brute force attacks.

U.L. defines Group 1 combination locks as resistant to skilled manipulation attacks for up to twenty hours. A manipulation attack is any attempt to discern the combination on the lock using the features and weaknesses in the design of the lock.  For example, if you've ever seen a movie with a safe cracker attempting to listen (possibly with a stethoscope) to learn the combination, this is considered a manipulation attack.  In addition, any attempt to randomly or systematically explore the namespace of combinations (the allowed range of possible combinations) is also a manipulation attack.  The Group 1 lock is generally a very advanced mechanical lock that precisely designed to prevent the workings of the lock from betraying the combination.  These locks are only used on the highest rated and most expensive safes.  However, these locks are generally very expensive and have largely been supplanted by Group 1 Electronic locks because the electronic locks provide similar protection, but are priced much more affordably.

U.L. also defines the minimum number of combinations that the lock will allow, which is 1,000,000.  However, this is a technical specification and on most locks there are specific recommended restrictions in assigning a combination that effectively limits the allowable combinations.  For example, it is recommended to avoid an approximate 20 digit range for the last number on a three-number combination lock.  On the S&G 6741 (the standard Group 2 combination lock we use) that range is 95-15.  While it is possible to set the final number to somewhere in that range, it will most likely cause problems when attempting to open the lock due to the lock design.  In addition, all locks have dialing tolerances, which is how much error is allowed in dialing the combination before the lock won't open.  The S&G 6741 has a +/- 1.25 dialing tolerance.  This means that the lock can be dialed up to 1.25 digits above or below the actual set number and still open, essentially giving you a 2.5 digit window to hit.  The S&G 6730, however, has only a +/- .5 dialing tolerance, essentially giving a 1 digit window to hit. While many locksmiths might prefer the S&G 6730, it can be notoriously difficult to open and very unforgiving to human error.  In addition, slight alterations to the lock (for example, if the dial or the dial ring was bumped during shipping) can shift the combination, rendering the lock unusable.  For this reason, most manfacturers tend to prefer the S&G 6741 because it's easier to use.  U.L. specifies that Group 1 locks have a dialing tolerance of no more than +/- 1 for a three number combination lock.

In addition, Group 1 locks are required to have an internal relocking system that fires when the lock is punched.  Punching (using a hammer and punch tool) is done to try to push the lock off the back of the safe by driving a punch (or any object long and sturdy enough) through the dial spindle hole.  If this is done, the usually the internals of the lock will be pushed out (leaving the frame) but a device will spring into place preventing the bolt itself from being retracted.  However, if the entire lock is managed to be punched through (not just the 'guts' of the lock), then no relocking system internal to the lock will be effective.  For that reason, we at Hayman Safe have developed a secondary relocking system designed to fire a secondary bolt in the case that the lock is punched out.  This secondary relocking bolt adds another layer of security to the safe.  Every standard Hayman Safe has this feature.

In general, Group 1 locks are considered suitable for TRTL-30 safes and above.  Please note that Hayman Safe doesn't carry any Group 1 locks in stock.  We can order them, but it will usually delay any order several weeks.

 

U.L. Group 1R Mechanical Lock

U.L. (Underwriter's Labratory, Inc.) is an independent, third party product certification organization that rigorously tests products to ensure they conform to certain safety and security standards. Once a product is certified, it carries the U.L. label to give consumers confidence that the product will provide a certain degree of security and safety. As part of the certification, U.L. will routinely visit the manufacturer to make sure the certified product continues to meet the standard.  When it comes to locks, U.L. defines not only specifics on the construction of the lock, but also it's resistance to manipulation attacks.  They do not, however, specify any kind of resistance to brute force attacks.

U.L. defines Group 1R combination locks as resistant to skilled manipulation attacks for up to twenty hours. A manipulation attack is any attempt to discern the combination on the lock using the features and weaknesses in the design of the lock.  For example, if you've ever seen a movie with a safe cracker attempting to listen (possibly with a stethoscope) to learn the combination, this is considered a manipulation attack.  In addition, any attempt to randomly or systematically explore the namespace of combinations (the allowed range of possible combinations) is also a manipulation attack. 

In addition, U.L. specifies that the lock must be resistant to twenty hours of radiological attack.  Radiological attacks are attempts to discern the interior workings of the lock (and thus the combination) using some form of radiation, x-rays as an example.  The Group 1R lock is generally a very advanced mechanical lock that precisely designed to prevent the workings of the lock from betraying the combination.  These locks are only used on the highest rated and most expensive safes.  However, these locks are generally very expensive and have largely been supplanted by Group 1 Electronic locks because the electronic locks provide similar protection, but are priced much more affordably.

U.L. also defines the minimum number of combinations that the lock will allow, which is 1,000,000.  However, this is a technical specification and on most locks there are specific recommended restrictions in assigning a combination that effectively limits the allowable combinations.  For example, it is recommended to avoid an approximate 20 digit range for the last number on a three-number combination lock.  On the S&G 6741 (the standard Group 2 combination lock we use) that range is 95-15.  While it is possible to set the final number to somewhere in that range, it will most likely cause problems when attempting to open the lock due to the lock design.  In addition, all locks have dialing tolerances, which is how much error is allowed in dialing the combination before the lock won't open.  The S&G 6741 has a +/- 1.25 dialing tolerance.  This means that the lock can be dialed up to 1.25 digits above or below the actual set number and still open, essentially giving you a 2.5 digit window to hit.  The S&G 6730, however, has only a +/- .5 dialing tolerance, essentially giving a 1 digit window to hit. While many locksmiths might prefer the S&G 6730, it can be notoriously difficult to open and very unforgiving to human error.  In addition, slight alterations to the lock (for example, if the dial or the dial ring was bumped during shipping) can shift the combination, rendering the lock unusable.  For this reason, most manfacturers tend to prefer the S&G 6741 because it's easier to use.  U.L. specifies that Group 1R locks have a dialing tolerance of no more than +/- 1 for a three number combination lock.

In addition, Group 1R locks are required to have an internal relocking system that fires when the lock is punched.  Punching (using a hammer and punch tool) is done to try to push the lock off the back of the safe by driving a punch (or any object long and sturdy enough) through the dial spindle hole.  If this is done, the usually the internals of the lock will be pushed out (leaving the frame) but a device will spring into place preventing the bolt itself from being retracted.  However, if the entire lock is managed to be punched through (not just the 'guts' of the lock), then no relocking system internal to the lock will be effective.  For that reason, we at Hayman Safe have developed a secondary relocking system designed to fire a secondary bolt in the case that the lock is punched out.  This secondary relocking bolt adds another layer of security to the safe.  Every standard Hayman Safe has this feature.

In general, Group 1R locks are considered suitable for TRTL-30 safes and above.  Please note that Hayman Safe does not carry Group 1R locks in stock.  We can order them, but it will delay any order several weeks.

 

U.L. Type 1 Electronic Lock

U.L. (Underwriter's Labratory, Inc.) is an independent, third party product certification organization that rigorously tests products to ensure they conform to certain safety and security standards. Once a product is certified, it carries the U.L. label to give consumers confidence that the product will provide a certain degree of security and safety. As part of the certification, U.L. will routinely visit the manufacturer to make sure the certified product continues to meet the standard.  When it comes to locks, U.L. defines not only specifics on the construction of the lock, but also its resistance to manipulation attacks.

U.L. defines Type 1 Electronic locks as highly resistant to expert manipulation. It should be noted that there really isn't much "manipulating" you can do with an electronic lock. There are no tumblers or wheel packs that could betray the combination. There are no mechanical auto-dialers that can run through the many thousands of combinations in a matter of days. In fact, on most locks, if you enter the wrong combination too many times the lock will disable itself for several minutes, making any kind of guesswork or systematic dialing attacks cumbersome. In addition, electronic locks are completely radiological proof, making them much cheaper equivalents to a Group 1R Combination lock (x-raying an electronic lock will reveal a circuit board which is not very helpful in determining the combination). However, despite these inherent strengths of electronic locks, there are certain elements of lock design that are essential to security. The first is that the combination itself should always be kept in the lock itself on the inside of the door. Otherwise, a thief could simply replace the keypad and dial the lock open with a default code. The second is that the lock should be stored in some kind of NVRAM (Non-Volatile Random Access Memory). This means the lock will retain the combination even if its source of power (usually a battery) is removed. The third is that the lock itself should initiate the draw-back of the bolt, not the keypad. This prevents a savvy thief from cutting the wires to the keypad and applying voltage to the wires to draw back the bolt. A fourth consideration (non-security related) is that the batteries should be in the keypad. This prevents legitimate users from being permanently locked out when the battery dies and the safe is locked.

U.L. also defines the minimum number of combinations that the lock will allow, which is 1,000,000. Unlike just about all mechanical locks, this is an actual usable range in electronic locks. There are no dialing tolerances or restricted zones (see mechanical lock ratings for more info) that effectively limit the number of usable combinations. However, it is recommended that you avoid certain number combinations like the factory default code (1-2-3-4-5-6 on most models) and easy to guess codes (birthdays, other significant dates, and sequential or repeating numbers, ex: 5-5-5-5-5-5 or 4-5-6-7-8-9, etc). A smart thief will use any safe's greatest weakness: the user. People want to remember their codes, and so they use easy to remember numbers, often centering around an important date. So by studying the user, learning their habits or what is important to them, the thief can get into the safe with only a few well placed guesses. 

Just as with mechanical locks, U.L. requires that Type 1 Electronic locks have an internal relocking system that fires when the lock is punched.  Punching (using a hammer and punch tool) is done to try to push the lock off the back of the safe by driving a punch (or any object long and sturdy enough) through the dial spindle hole. If this is done, usually the internals of the lock will be pushed out (leaving the frame) but a device will spring into place preventing the bolt itself from being retracted. However, if the entire lock is managed to be punched through (not just the 'guts' of the lock), then no relocking system internal to the lock will be effective. For that reason, we at Hayman Safe have developed a secondary relocking system designed to fire a secondary bolt in the case that the lock is punched out. This secondary relocking bolt adds another layer of security to the safe.  Every standard Hayman Safe has this feature.

Type 1 Electronic locks are suitable for just about any safe, from simple RSC containers up to the most expensive U.L.-TL Rated safes. In addition, they make an attractive alternative to the Group 1 or Group 1R locks required on the higher security TL safes.